Last December Japan for the first time hosted a summit of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The meeting released a declaration in which the Japan-backed concept of "East Asia Community" was included, though its outlook and content were not clearly defined.

Nevertheless, prior to this meeting, the strategic concept of "East Asia Community" was outlined in terms of both security and economy in two reports submitted to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi by the Japan International Forum, a non-governmental think-tank.

The reports were examined and signed by well-known scholars and elite figures from political and commercial circles. Officials from related governmental institutions also expressed their views when the report on the East Asia security system was examined, which evinced that this report, though forwarded by a non-governmental institution, at least partially reflected the viewpoints of some government officials.

Submitted in December 2002 and entitled "Building a Co-operative System for East Asian Security" (hereafter referred to as Report 1), it suggests the short-term, mid-term and long-term goals of establishing East Asia's security system. It demonstrates that Japan is seeking to adjust its security strategy towards East Asia in the wake of the September 11 event, considering not only boosting regional co-operation in the field of non-traditional security, but containing China strategically in the security aspect.

The key points of Report 1 are as follows:

First, Japan's mid-term and long-term goals are to establish a "pluralistic security community" whose members will not have large-scale armed conflicts with each other. The alliances between the United States and East Asian nations are stressed as the guarantee of East Asia's security.

There is nothing new in such rhetoric, but it expounds on Japan's efforts to pursue regional recognition of the strong US-Japan alliance.

Second, it suggests that the security guarantee function of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) be expanded through enhancing its preventive diplomacy and capability for resolving conflicts.

Third, it pushes strategic reformation of various multilateral framework mechanisms for resolving issues concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Fourth, it advocates the Taiwan question should be viewed as "an issue of international concern" and that a multilateral framework allowing the participation of both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should be created to discuss the Taiwan question.

This is in fact an attempt to create "one China and one Taiwan" situation and to interfere with China's internal affairs by making use of the East Asian security co-operation mechanism.

Fifth, it advocates setting up new "voluntary allies" by taking advantage of existing organizations to deal with major domestic crises in East Asia. This undoubtedly means serious intervention in other nations' internal affairs and poses a naked menace and provocation to their national security.

Report 1 stresses that international terrorism should be defined as the common threat to East Asia and that a comprehensive co-operation system should be established to counter it.

It also urges reforms of systems and legislation, including revising Japan's pacifist Constitution, which will only arouse deeper concern among its Asian neighbours.

In June 2003, the Japan International Forum submitted to the Japanese Prime Minister another report on the concept of East Asia economic community and Japan's role (hereafter referred to as Report 2). It raises the strategic aim as well as the timetable for establishing East Asia Economic Community.

It stresses that Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore should play a core role in the Community by creating a Free Trade Area in 2005, while hoping China will play a partial leading role.

It suggests promoting the integration and free mobility of East Asia's labour market and a single capital market in a bid to form an East Asia financial centre and to gradually realize a single currency.

Obviously, the two reports cannot both represent the Japanese Government's overall strategic concept and steps of "East Asia Community."

But they do demonstrate Japan has made some important adjustments to its East Asia strategy, with different emphasis on security and economy.

With regard to how to deal with China, the core views of the two reports appear at odds.

Report 1 advocates establishment of an East Asian multilateral security co-operation system to prevent and contain China on the Taiwan question, issues of the South China Sea, arms control and domestic unrest, which does not conform to the fundamental interests of both China and Japan and will have negative impact upon the Sino-Japanese relations.

Report 2, however, indicates the direction towards East Asia's economic integration and single currency, which can be viewed as positive.

Such a difference in the tone of the two reports submitted by the same institution is to some extent attributable to the formation of the examiners of the reports. Most of the examiners of Report 2 are economists and scholars on China studies who have relatively objective viewpoints, while some examiners of Report 1 are hawkish congressmen who advocate an "engagement and containment" policy towards China.

Important domestic and international factors have also influenced Japan's shift in its East Asia strategy.

In terms of security, profound changes have taken place in its domestic politics. New-generation politicians have completely replaced those from the World War II generation. The reformist forces have also been replaced by conservative forces. The post-war legal and policy system and pacifism are facing the shock of nationalism.

Following the "pre-emptive strategy" of the US in the wake of September 11, 2001, Japan has indicated it would adopt a similar strategy to deal with any missile threat. It even dispatched its self-defence forces to Iraq despite the danger of suffering terrorist attacks.

Meanwhile, Japan feels it is necessary and urgent to enhance international co-operation in the field of non-traditional security such as combating terrorism.

Malaysia raised the concept of an "East Asian Economic Group" in 1990. However, fearing a backlash from the US, Japan adopted an inactive attitude.

Economic globalization and regionalization prompted Japan's change in its stance. China and ASEAN reached agreement on establishing a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area by 2010. To avoid being isolated and marginalized and to maintain its leading position in Asia, Japan had to adjust its policy which attached more importance strategically to strengthening economic integration with East Asia.

Though there exists ample room for further economic co-operation between China and Japan, Japan has not deviated from its strategy of containing China. In fact, large-scale reduction of its governmental development aid to China indicates any future economic co-operation with Tokyo will to some extent hinge on Japan's well-entrenched security strategy.