Chinese President Hu Jintao visited St. Petersburg for the meeting between developing countries and the Group of Eight (G8) developed countries on the sidelines of the group's annual summit on July 17. This is the third handshake between China and G8. How should China get along with the group? How about their future relations?

In general, this summit is held under increased difficulties within the West. President George W. Bush ran into a "second-term curse", with his approval rate dropping to about 30 percent. The European Union entered a "healing period" and has not stepped out of the shadow of EU Constitution failure. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi will end his term in September, so this will be his last trip to G8. On the other hand, international oil price stays high and will endanger the world economy; Doha talks stagnated. Iraq is on the verge of civil war; Afghanistan keeps struggling in disturbance; the Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis lingers on; the DPRK missile tests have added uncertainties to Northeast Asia and conflicts between Israel and Lebanon have escalated...under such sophisticated circumstances the possibility for G8 to achieve much is very slim.

During the 1990s G7 began to pay attention to China's growing economic strength and its global role. Particularly, the country won international acclaim for its behavior in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. After that, G8 has more than once extended the olive branch to China. In 1999, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, as leader of the host country, warmly invited China to attend, and even said openly the club should draw China in; when the summit was held in Okinawa, 2000, Japan also invited China to join dialogue with G8 leaders; on the eve of the 2002 meeting, the group all the more sent the message via various channels asking China to attend as a non-voting delegate.

The first handshake between China and G8 came at the Evian conference in France, June 2003. President Hu Jintao attended at invitation, opening close contacts between China and the club. This marks a diplomatic breakthrough in relations between the two sides. Last year, China attended a similar dialogue meeting in Britain.

G8 has drawn increasing criticism in recent years, its authority declined due to a lack of representation in global governance. At the same time a large number of developing powers emerged rapidly, with rising position in and influence over the world economy. G8 has become aware that effective discussion on world economy and development must involve dialogue with these developing countries. To extricate itself from the difficult position, the group began to change functions and strengthen external contacts, during which expanded dialogues with developing nations have became a characteristic of G8 summit transformation.

Judging from current conditions, it is in line with Chinese interests to keep a convenient distance with G8. It is quite unlikely that China joins the group in short term. China is a developing country, for which G8 as a club of the rich has apparently not reserved a comfortable seat. Moreover, G8 has its own set of political and economic standards, which China finds unacceptable at least for present stage. Russia, for example, does not mix well with the group. It joined the club in 1998 out of political needs, but was reduced into a second-class citizen, and has had little say on economic questions. So, Russia is eager to establish itself as an equal member of the group by taking the opportunity as the host.

From a long-term perspective, closer contacts between China and G8 are possible, which will give China bigger say in world economy. On the other hand, China will be more able to express concerns on behalf of developing countries, and also increase the representation of G8. China should follow a natural and comfortable way in developing its ties with G8.

Comments by Ruan Zongze, deputy director of China Institute of International Studies, was frontpaged by People's Daily Overseas Edition, July 17, and translated by People's Daily Online.