The foreign policy of the United States resembles an iron plate to outsiders, and it seems consistent with a single theory for so many years. In fact, this is not true. In case of the foreign policy pursued by President George W. Bush, it was guided by new conservatism during his first term of office, which was coupled with uni-polarity, preemptive attack and appeal to arms, and led to a frequent change of powers in some countries; and this policy rant rampant at times but with little effect.

With Condoleezza Rice assuming as the secretary of state during the second term, Bush began readjusting his foreign policy, again heeding the role of the United Nations, stepping up consultations with allies and other big powers with a sway shown from uni-polarity to multi-polarity. Outwardly, the diplomacy of Rice is poles apart from that of his predecessor. But from careful analysis, one can see the diplomacy has not returned to the traditional realistic track without effecting a through transformation.

The report of the "Iraq Study Group" co-chaired by former Secretary of State James A. Baker and Democrat Lee H. Hamilton, nevertheless, gives expression to the dividing line between the two divergent foreign policies. The most eminent disparity focuses on whether or not to have contact with Iran and Syria. The contacting proposal by the study group confronted Rice with a query. And she capitalized on the opportunity to denounce in stern words the two nations for their backing of terrorism.

The second obvious disparity is whether the US foreign policy should be focused on the values or practical interest. Both the starting point and ending point of the study report are how to stabilize the situation in Iraq and in the Middle East at large, so as to enable the U.S. to get away with dignity. There was no mention of the "great strategic goals" of turning Iraq into a "democratic example" and the "Greater Middle-East Initiative" in the report, and so it is out of tune with Rice's "transformative diplomacy," in which she proposes hosting the banner of "democracy and freedom" for "democratic" remolding of the Middle-East nations.

The two opposing foreign policy lines have their own originalities with different historical backgrounds. James Backer, co-chairman of the Iraq Study Group, was the Secretary of State under former US President George Bush. Baker was initiator and executor of the realistic diplomacy during his term of office, and he stood for equilibrium of regional powers and gives importance to the maneuvering and negotiation in diplomatic strategy. Upon the release of his Iraq Study Report, Baker said the stability of Iraq also conforms to the interests of Iran and Syria. Therefore, he noted, the two nations were also the objects to win over. Since it could negotiate with its sworn foe the former Soviet Union during the cold war era, why can't the U.S. today have a try to talk with Iran and Syria, since Iran lent a helping hand to the U.S. during the Afghanistan War and Syria sided with it during the Gulf War. Even if the talks fail, the U.S. will have nothing to lose and why doesn't it have a try?

In the view of Rice, for the countries of a different kind like Iran and Syria, they have only to be contained or assaulted if they are not targeted for military strikes and an ensuing change of power as advocated by new conservatism. Despite lusters added to her diplomacy, she rejects compromises. Her diplomatic practice has apparent intrinsic traces from new conservatism in her propositions for pursuit of "isolated diplomacy", "sanction diplomacy" and "confrontation diplomacy". This point was self-evident in the "Israel-Lebanon conflict" occurred in the summer of 2006, for Rice had not abandoned a dream of achieving her "Great Middle-East Initiative" with military strikes.

Consequently, "idealism" represents another connotation of Rice's foreign policy line. "The Middle-East has suffered for 60 years from a freedom deficit," Rice said. "It has suffered from the absence of legitimate channels for political expression. It has suffered from the absence of democratic change at a time when the entire rest of the world... has moved to democratic structures."

People seem to see the explicit dividing lines between the two opposing foreign policy lines from the above remarks of Rice's. Veteran diplomat James A. Baker, aware of the complexity and transferability of the relations between the foes and friends and the necessity for comprise, advocates a multi-polar diplomacy with a diplomatic equilibrium and proposes taking an international line, in an attempt to return the adventurous US diplomacy to the traditional track of realism. And Rice, however, has moved along the double track of new conservatism and idealism, which inclines to divide the world habitually into either black or white, either as friends or enemies with such options simplified as either "claiming friendship with them" or "meting out telling blows to them."

To date, patience is still needed to go on observing and studying with composure developments of the United States' two divergent foreign policy lines in contention.

(Translated by the People's Daily On-line. The author Li Xuejiang is chief correspondent of the People's Daily stationed in the U.S.)